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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of environmental policy in imperfectly competi-
tive market with private information. We examine how environmental taxes should be
optimally levied when the regulator faces asymmetric information about production
and abatement costs in an irreversible observable policy commitment game. Under
our setting, the paper investigates how information disclosure can improve the e¢ -
ciency of the tax setting process and may o¤er an e¢ cient complement to conventional
regulatory approaches. From a policy perspective, our ndings suggest that access
to publicly disclosed information improves the ability of the regulator to levy rms
specic environmental taxes. Despite its advantages, however, informational disclosure
may harm the environmental policy it purports to enhance since it facilitates collusive
behavior. We show that information sharing may occur and thus leads to a superior
outcome in terms of industry output and emissions. Disclosure may undermine market
performance and environmental policy.
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1 Introduction
Environmental taxation is part of mainstream environmental thought and policy. Emis-
sions taxes are the most widely used and historically experienced market-based instruments
in addressing environmental policies. Their design aims to accomplish deep and structural
changes in the economic and ecological behavior of individuals, households, and rms by ad-
justing price signals in an environmentally positive manner. Environmental taxes have many
advantages when compared to other instruments and policies. Their role is not limited to
correcting the externality. They allow least-cost abatement, raise governmental revenues1,
provide incentives to polluters to internalize the negative external e¤ects of their activities.
Public authorities may also use environmental taxes in order to nance public goods. For
instance, many OECD countries impose emissions taxes on several industries to fund the
cleanup of highly polluted old activities such as inactive hazards and to partially subsidize
social programs2 or the development of renewable energies. In addition, recycling revenues
from environmental taxes may lead to a double dividend, according to Goulders denition
(Goulder (1995)), by improving the environmental quality and achieving a less distortionary
tax system. Furthermore, recycling environmental taxes may nd positive impacts on scal
re-balancing in many countries: in the current economic circumstances, these taxes can be
a signicant source of scal revenue and thus can contribute to reduce major scal decits
in many European countries3.
More recently, the idea of an internationally harmonized Carbon tax commands some
intellectual respect to reduce the global e¤ects of greenhouse gas emissions and meet a certain
target level of Climate change. It is true today that we do not know yet the type of regulatory
institutions, including policy instruments and participants, that will succeed the post-2012
Kyoto Protocol in the multinational e¤orts to stabilize Carbon emissions and concentrations
in the atmosphere in order to slow global warming. Therefore, the plausible architecture may
include an industry-specic Global Carbon Tax. According to Nordhaus (Nordhaus (2007,
2015)), an internationally harmonized but nationally retained Carbon tax may be proposed
as an instrument to achieve some strategic aspects of international environmental agreements
including those focused on Climate change. Furthermore, recycling revenues from Carbon
1According to EUROSTAT (Environmental Statistics and Accounts in Europe 332, 2010), environmentally
related taxes range from a few percent and up to 12 percent of total taxes and social contributions in European
countries. For instance, many EU Member States have used di¤erent energy taxes on the road transport
sector, mainly for revenue-raising purposes.
2In the United States, a regulatory fee on lead paint manufacturers imposed by the State of California
was used in part to fund government programs that addressed the health risks of children exposed to such
emissions.
3As noted by the OECD (2012), environmental taxation provides potentially a win-win option by pro-
tecting the environment and reducing greenhhouse gases, and addressing scal consolidation.
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tax may reduce distortive taxes, e.g. taxes on labor or capital (ILO (2009))4. Finally, such
Carbon tax is more easily administrated and more transparent then a cap-and-trade system
(Weitzman (2014)).
As market-based instruments, emissions taxes are today much better understood and
are widely accepted by both the public and policy makers. The structure and the e¢ ciency
properties of pollution taxes have been analyzed under di¤erent market structures (Kat-
soulacos and Xepapadeas (1995); Requate (2005)). Since Weitzmans seminal work "Prices
vs. Quantities" (Weitzman (1978, 1974)), there has been a growing interest in the analy-
sis of environmental taxes under informational uncertainties (Lee (1999); Stavins (1996);
Ulph (1996)). Under asymmetric information, for many real world externalities, emissions
taxes set at the level that appears to be optimal ex ante fail to attain the optimal solution
(Shrestha (2001)). Thus, the proper design of environmental taxes largely depends on the
regulatory context and other informational distortions (Antelo and Loureiro (2009); Carlsson
(2000); Chavez and Stranlund (2009); Hoel and Karp (2001); Long and Soubeyran (2005);
Malueg and Yates (2009); McKitrick (1999)). In order to provide recommendations with
respect to environmental policy, it is important to understand and acknowledge the poten-
tial impacts and limitations of such taxes in very heterogeneous informational environments.
Research continues to rene our understanding of emissions taxes and their performance,
implementation and relative role under di¤erent informational uncertainties.
In this paper, we highlight a way in which the design and implementation of environ-
mental regulation can be improved by focusing on the potential for e¤ective emissions taxes
through disclosure. In our setting, publicly disclosed information is intended to enhance
environmental e¢ ciency by addressing problems of information asymmetry: in general in-
formation is misleading, or is simply di¢ cult to obtain or to evaluate, or cannot be used
because of behavioral bias. Thus, disclosure can be used to inuence the ow of information
in a specic market, which will reduce risks and costs to the regulator in decision-making,
monitoring and enforcement5. Despite its advantages, however, informational disclosure may
harm the environmental policy it purports to enhance since it gives incentives to players to
collude. Questions examined in this paper include: Under what conditions publicly disclosed
information enhances the environmental tax setting process? Does it induce changes in the
behavior of players in the marketplace and lead to a reduction in emissions? Our aim is
also to understand the motivation and possible barriers to share information between rms
4The International Labour Organization reports that a global price on CO2 would rise global employment
by cutting labour taxes.
5Information disclosure may also o¤er an e¢ cient complement to conventional regulatory approaches in
improving the e¢ ciency of the tax setting process, e.g. reducing information asymmetries and improving
transparency.
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which is important for designing e¤ective environmental policy. In other words, is there any
incentive for a rm to share information and coordinate its actions with othersactions?
To this end, since public authorities often lack information they need for e¢ cient regu-
lation of the commons, we consider a tractable model in which a regulatory agency seeks to
control emissions from players producing homogenous commodity under costs uncertainties.
A Stackelberg-Cournot setting is developed: the regulator who usually possesses sovereign
authority, occupies the position of the leader and commits ex ante to a decision and an-
nounces it to the followers. This implies that the regulatory decision once made remains
in force for an extended period of time while rivals respond in the marketplace. Then, the
model analyzes the situation where the regulator designs environmental taxes based on the
presence of publicly disclosed information and private signals, avoiding the need to specify
the nature of the probability distributions of costs uncertainties6. We show that access to
more detailed information improves the ability of the regulator to set e¢ ciently emissions
taxes. Therefore, requiring agents to reveal some information may lead to behavior intended
to conceal or distort this information. Thus, it is important to analyze the impact of policy
commitment on information transmission by allowing rms to share information. In other
words, we examine whether environmental regulation could reverse some well-known results
about the e¤ects of information sharing. We show that, by facilitating collusion, making in-
formation publicly available can undermine market performance and environmental policy.
Public authorities often lack of the information they need in setting environmental policy.
They can neither foresee nor control the uncertainties at the time they design environmental
policy. Under costs uncertainties, policy design requires a complete information about the
probability distributions of the uncertainties which is rarely available to the social planner a
priori.7 Even in the absence of such information, the regulator can make some assumptions
about the probability distributions and try to design a better emissions tax. However, if
such ex ante assumptions turn out to be wrong, the designed policy may turn out to be even
worse than the one that completely ignores the presence of costs uncertainties.
Furthermore, at the time when policy decisions are made, it is uncertain which state
of the world will emerge. Hence, environmental policy cannot be revised and subsequently
6The information structure adopted in this paper is di¤erent from that adopted in the respective literature,
especially the mechanism design literature which provides approaches to elicit the private information of
rms. These usually induce higher administrative costs than those of the conventional instruments such as
emissions taxes. To our knowledge the revelation approach has not had a great inuence on environmental
policy debates and has not been employed in real pollution control situation.
7For example, Karp and Yohe (1979) and Weitzman (1978) presented an optimal environmental instru-
ment in a situation where the social planner can correctly characterize the probability of the uncertainties
a priori. Both papers considered the second order Taylor approximation of costs and make some regulatory
assumptions about the probability distributions of the uncertainties (Shrestha (2001)).
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be adjusted in the light of actual circumstances. If it is possible to periodically adjust
the levels of regulatory variables in response to the realized and observed levels of costs
at each period, then the regulator may approximate the optimal solution. Unfortunately,
in many environmental problems and in most policy contexts, adjustments request long
administrative and legal procedures, i.e., the regulator cannot change its policy decision
periodically but must enforce it for a xed period of time. Thus, in order to accomplish their
mission in protecting the environment, policy makers may welcome any available information,
even though it is incomplete, which helps them to overcome the burden of uncertainty about
the state of the world and the likely actions of polluters. Such valuable information could
come from mandatory reporting or simply from empirical studies of how observables like
production and pollution control technologies and input and output levels determine rms
abatement costs. For example, suppose in a particular emission control setting that the
regulator has some information about how production and abatement costs vary with input
and output levels. If fuel is substituted by other green inputs and the regulator knows
something about how green inputs a¤ect abatement costs, then this information can be
optimally used in setting di¤erentiated green taxes as policy instruments for environmental
protection.
Today, reporting and information disclosure by public agencies, World Environmental
Organizations, NGOs or watchdog groups may be an interesting complement for traditional
forms of regulation in protecting the environment and may have a signicant e¤ect on the
environmental performance of rms and future compliance and emissions. In addition, dis-
closure programs may cost the government far less than drafting and implementing industry-
specic complex regulations, and allow regulators to spend their time where it will have the
most bang for its buck. For instance, the US Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Programs require
certain industries to annually report their toxic emissions. Between 1988 and 1999, these pro-
grams led to a signicant voluntary decrease in the total amount of TRI chemicals released in
the United States, beyond any mandated levels or legal requirement. Similar programs have
been instituted in other countries and contexts, including the Canadian National Pollutant
Release Inventory or the European Pollutant Emission Register. More recently, in response
to public concerns about the known and unknown risks of drilling and slick-water fractur-
ing8, the US environmental laws9 require information disclosure of the chemicals associated
with such activities. Therefore, the more meaningful e¤orts toward disclosing chemicals
8A now-common technique that consists of injecting water and chemicals down wells at high pressure.
9For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act and Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-know Act require operators in the United States to keep material safety data sheets for chemicals on their
sites.
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have occurred at the State and industry levels. A growing number of states10 have required
post-fracturing disclosure of the identity of chemicals used at well sites, a description of the
quantity of each chemical used, and, often, a description of the quantity of water used. The
knowledge of chemical-based inputs in the US fracturing industry may be considered as an
important component of addressing environmental regulation. Thus, disclosed information
might be used strategically as an e¢ cient complement to existing regulatory requirement
and induces the regulator to set non-uniform taxes across rms.
Our setting may characterize many types of oligopolistic markets where policy changes
require long administrative and legal procedures. This is true under complex international
negotiations which cannot be readily changed in response to playersactions. This policy
setting is also relevant in industries where players generate a negative externality for an
extensive region or country and where the regulator as well as competitors accumulate some
accurate information about operating and production costs of complying with the environ-
mental regulation since polluters interact recurrently with the regulator in order to fulll the
requirements imposed by environmental policy. This is obviously the case of energy compa-
nies using fossil fuels and the chemicals industry. Thus, one possible practical interpretation
of our model is that it represents the type of policy decision that has to be made about
pollution in the utility industries. Such policy instrument could be potentially adjusted to
deal with greenhouse gases in the U.S. energy sector, where electricity is produced by rms
engaged in a competition à la Cournot (SO2/CO2 emissions market). It also can be adjusted
to deal with chemicals in the fracturing industry. The model may also be applied to the
European wholesale energy market where the European Commission is requesting market
participants to report part of the private information on their activities publicly available.
The data relating to generation units, transportation and consumption of electricity which
need to be made available to market participants are very detailed11.
Before turning to the analysis of environmental policy, a few words regarding our model
setup and linearity assumptions are needed. First, the model is exible, relevant in the
management of the commons, and admits several interpretations in terms of rms com-
peting in a homogeneous product market such as wholesale electricity. The model is also
relevant in the management of the commons, e.g. the shery industry. Second, the paper fol-
lows the tradition of the literature on environmental taxation and considers linear-Bayesian
10From 2010 through 2012, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming all updated,
released, or proposed new statutes, agency directives, or regulations to require basic chemical disclosure.
11See EU regulation No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2011 on
wholesale energy market integrity and transparency, O¢ cial Journal of the European Union, L 361, 8,
December 2011. See also Commission Regulation (EU) No 543/2013 of 14 June 2013 on submission and
publication of data in electricity markets.
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equilibrium. Our modeling setup assumes linear-quadratic payo¤s coupled with an a¢ ne in-
formation structure which admits two components, common and private values, that yields
a unique linear Bayesian equilibrium of the game. The rst component represents publicly
disclosed information and the second component is private information which obeys a lin-
ear conditional expectation property. Third, linear equilibrium is tractable, particularly in
the presence of noisy private information, and has proved to be very useful as a basis for
empirical analysis. Fourth, our model covers the case in which rms in the marketplace
cannot exclude the possibility of collusion. Since information exchange and coordination
within an industry is important for designing e¤ective environmental policy, our purpose is
to understand under what conditions information sharing is benecial.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explore the model
setup that provides the basis for environmental regulation under two informational regimes.
We analyze the optimal tax rule under complete and asymmetric information settings in
Section 3. Comparative statics and special cases are performed and examined in the same
section. In Section 4 we analyze whether rms in the marketplace have incentive to share
valuable information about their marginal costs when they are private to the rms. Conclu-
sions are in Section 5. Technical proofs are relegated in the Appendices.
2 Model
The modelling framework for the analysis of environmental tax under costsuncertainties
aims to place our results in relation to the respective literature. Specically, this requires
a presumption of linear marginal costs as well as linear demand function, which demands
caution in the interpretation of our ndings. Therefore, the results can be a quite good
approximation for more general functions, provided that the feasible value range of the
random variable is su¢ ciently small (Weitzman (1974)).
We consider a single polluting industry with I = f1; 2g non-identical rms producing a
homogeneous nal good and generating emissions. We might think of this commodity as
the energy but other interpretations are possible. Consumerspreferences are described by
a quasi-linear function:
 (Q; Y ) =  Q 


2

Q2 + Y ; ;   0;
where Y  0 represents the aggregate amount of a numéraire commodity (residual income), is
produced in an exogenous market and thus can be neglected throughout the further analysis.
The consumers utility maximization program gives rise to the following inverse demand
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function:
p (Q) =   Q; (1)
where p denotes the unit price of the good and Q =
P2
i=1 qi is the total output of the
industry. We assume that emissions by rm i; ei; are proportional to rm output qi:
ei =  qi; 8i 2 I; 0 <  < 1: (2)
Emissions depend on the technology of production used by each rm and can be reduced
through the choice of an abatement technology, and also by varying the level of output
produced. For instance, a power utility which adopts an environmental friendly abatement
technology (renewable energy or Carbon capture and storage) will face an increase in the
subsequent cost of producing each unit of output and might be able to reduce emissions more
e¤ectively than a dirty power station that has selected initially a relatively cheap technology
involving low operating and production unit costs (coal). For instance, in the electricity sec-
tor, installation of Selective Catalytic Reduction, which incurs high costs, reduces greenhouse
gases (NOx) by up to 99%. In contrast, Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction has lower costs
but only reduces NOx emissions up to 35%. Thus, the initial abatement technology decision,
made before future regulation, will have implications for the costs of reducing emissions
during future operations.
We consider a tax per unit emissions: rm i must pay  i for each unit of emissions. This
tax rate must be set optimally by the regulator. The environmental damage in each period,
generated by the production activity is given by the following quadratic convex function:
D =
1
2
 E2;  > 0 (3)
where E = Pi2I ei represents the aggregate level of emissions or total pollution level. A
marginal increase in output, entails a positive and increasing environmental damage (i.e. pol-
lution is convex in output). The positive parameter  is an exogenous variable that captures
the regulators valuation of the environment.12 This type of damage function is commonly
used in the literature and assumes that this damage is exogenous for consumers: they do
not take into account the e¤ect of their consumption decisions on the environment.
12The parameter  can also represent the steepness of marginal damages or equivalently the degree of
convexity of the damage function.
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2.1 Information Structure
Following the pertinent literature, we introduce incomplete information by assuming that
agents observe noisy private and public signals about marginal costs. We assume that the
technology used by each rm is stochastic but it exhibits constant returns to scale13, namely
for a given state of the nature the marginal production and abatement cost is constant and is
equal to exi. Before choosing its strategy, each rm observes the following random variable14:
exi = eui + eci: (4)
The rst component, eui, is related to the publicly disclosed information and is observed
by all players, the regulator as well as both rms. We suppose that all eui;i2I are independent
and identically distributed with mean ui and variance 
2
ui
. The second component, eci, is
the private information of rm i and is not observable by the others. This is the sense in
which the signals are private. Prior to producing, each rm receives a noisy estimate of its
uncertain private marginal cost given by:
eci = es+ e"i (5)
The rst term on the right-hand side es is the common cost component that is the same
for all rms and represents the industry-wide shocks that a¤ects the rms. The second terme"i is a rm-specic noise term, which can be viewed as the remaining uncertainties or random
shocks that are not correlated across rms.
Assumption 1. Let es be a positive random variable and distributed according to some prior
density with mean c and nite variance 
2
c (i.e. es s (c; 2c)). Also, let e"i have mean zero
and variance 2".
15 In addition, e"i is uncorrelated with es and the noise terms of other rmse"j, j 6= i.
A rm can make inferences about the marginal cost of its rivals based upon its private
13This assumption is routinely made in the literature on environmental taxes for the sake of simplication,
but it does not restrict the generality of results.
14Most models in the respective literature are based on a non-separable cost function. This way of mod-
elling is necessarily associated with non-linear marginal costs and is thus incompatible with the framework
adopted in our paper. Hence, due to the need for linear marginal costs, we consider that the rmscost
function is additively separable. This insight is helpful for analyzing the presence of public and private infor-
mation in setting emission taxes. Therefore, our analysis can be extended to reect the case of non-constant
marginal costs. Note that this would not change the qualitative results of our paper.
15This implies that, in setting the tax rates, the regulator cannot observe the exact marginal costs, but
its expectation about the marginal costs functions turns out to be correct on the average.
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information16:
E[~cij~cj] =  ~cj + ;  = 
2
c
(2c + 
2
")
;  = (1  )c; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
This assumption states that the assumption that the signals are conditionally independent
can be replaced by the assumption that for each i and j, i 6= j, E [eci j ecj] is linear in ecj.
While in the related literature the signals are supposed in general to be binomial or nor-
mally distributed17, our assumption assume that the expectation of the true state conditional
on the signals is linear in the signals and thus is general enough to include some interest-
ing distributions. The linearity setting (about demand, costs and conditional expectations)
is analytically convenient and conceptually satisfactory because we do not need to specify
the distributions. Furthermore, we do not need to impose nonnegativity constraints on the
quantities of output and prices selected by the rms.
This information structure allows us to analyze how the di¤erent components of the
marginal costs contribute to the optimal environmental taxes. For example, if 2" equals
zero, then both rms can perfectly observe their rivals marginal costs, as there is no private
component. Similarly, if 2" and 
2
c both equal zero, then the marginal cost for rm i equals
the public component eui + c, so the regulator can perfectly observe each rms marginal
cost. Finally, if 2ui equals zero, then there is no public information about the marginal
costs, and the two rms are ex-ante symmetric for the regulator. Therefore, the information
available to agents can have important implications on the resulting optimal environmental
taxes and market outcomes.
In the following we suppose that all players, including the regulator, are perfectly in-
formed about the realizations of the public component. This assumption is made to simplify
the analysis. Our results hold in the case where players observe imperfectly the public
information.
Having described the information structure, we now explain the timing of the model:
1. Before agents move, nature draws randomly the public component of the marginal cost
feuigi2I : The realization of feuigi2I is perfectly observed by all players.
2. The risk neutral regulator sets the environmental taxes f igi2I optimally to maximize
the expected welfare.
16For more details, see Basar and Ho (1974); Ericson (1969); Gal-Or (1986); Li (1985); Shapiro (1986);
Vives (2002, 2001).
17The assumption of normality is very convenient analytically but has the drawback that prices and
quantities may take negative values.
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3. The common component of the marginal cost es is drawn randomly and observed by
both rms, but not by the regulator.
4. The private component of the marginal cost fe"igi2I is drawn randomly and observed
by the corresponding rm, but not by the regulator or the other rm.
5. Given the marginal costs and the environmental taxes, each risk neutral rm determines
its output and emission abatement levels.
The characterization of a linear equilibrium when there is market power and private
information needs some careful analysis to be able to model the capacity of a player in the
marketplace to inuence the optimal environmental policy. Our pollution-tax game can be
described as a Stackelberg game where the regulator is the leader and rms are the followers.
At an initial stage of the game, each rm makes a decision about information production and
disclosure. Importantly, information production and revelation decisions are taken prior to
the arrival of private information, so issues of incentives to reveal information are ignored.18
The revelation may result from direct regulatory oversight, or through other mechanisms such
as internal whistle-blowers, disclosures by the media or environmental watchdog groups, or
simply due to random events that bring information into the public domain.
Then at a subsequent stage, having observed the public component of the marginal costs,
the regulator sets f igi2I to maximize E(W ). Recall that the regulator can neither foresee
nor control the uncertainties at the time it makes the regulatory decision which remains in
force for an extended period of time so that there is no possibility of adjusting periodically
the levels of regulatory variables in response to the observed levels of costs. Finally, given
the taxes and the observed common and private values of the marginal costs, rms compete
as Cournot rivals and decide their output levels to maxqi E(i); for i 2 I. Each rms
production generates pollution ei, which a¤ects the environmental quality.
We solve this asymmetric information game by backward induction. First, we focus on
the rmsprot-maximization problem. Second, having derived the equilibrium output levels
and the price given the taxes, we return our attention to the regulators welfare maximization
problem and solve for the optimal rm-specic taxes per unit of emissions that maximizes
the expected welfare.
18In this case, there is no need to get into the details of information acquisition and how a certain rate of
decrease in individual information precision is achieved. One may just starts with a given rate and explores
the implication. Incorporating the details of information acquisition and the construction of the particular
acquisition function, although being interesting, require substantial e¤ort and analysis that does not add to
the insights we aim to present in this paper.
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2.2 Firms
In this section we characterize the behavior of producers, who are subject to a tax per
unit of emissions, set irrevocably by the regulator prior to the time at which rms commit
to their initial production decisions. We assume that the two rms are risk-neutral and act
as Cournot competitors in this duopoly market.19 Taking the tax rates as given, each rm
chooses its production level so as to maximize its expected prots conditional on its own
marginal cost:
maxeqi Eecj [(ep  eui   eci     i) eqi j eci; eui; euj] ; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (6)
where the market price depends on both rmsproduction level (i.e. ep =     (eq1 + eq2)).
Note that each rm predicts the other rms marginal conditional on its own marginal cost, so
the market price also depends on the marginal costs. Since we consider a linear demand and
constant marginal costs, we restrict our search to a linear equilibrium. Furthermore, under
our assumptions, the model satises the linear conditional expectation property. In other
words, the a¢ ne information structure of the model ensures that conditional expectations
are linear. Thus, the equilibrium strategies are a¢ ne in the observed signals.
Given the prot maximization problem in (6), we can solve for the linear equilibrium in
the usual way by identifying coe¢ cients with the candidate linear strategy:
eqi =i1 + i2 eci + i3 eui + i4 euj; 8i; j 2 I; i 6= j (7)
i1 =i0 + i1  i + i2  j: (8)
2.3 Regulator
Given the information structure and rmsoptimal behavior, the regulator sets an envi-
ronmental tax based on emissions. To do so optimally, the regulator maximizes the expected
social welfare function which includes the expected consumer surplus, E(CS), the rmsex-
pected prots,
P
i2I E(i), and the government total expected revenue generated by pollution
taxes, E(R), minus the expected value of environmental damage due to rmsproduction
19Market entry is not allowed in this setup. The regulator can be politically held responsible for forcing
rms out of the market or into bankruptcy. Furthermore, it may even be optimal for the regulator not to
induce bankruptcy, as bankruptcy will result in a lower total contribution by rms toward remediation costs,
leaving the regulator a larger "orphan share" of the costs to fund itself.
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process, E(D):
E(W ) = E (CS  D) +
2X
i=1
E(i) + ` E(R) (9)
where ` is a positive parameter which represents the relative importance of the indirect social
benet of environmental taxation, commonly called the second dividend that is used to
diminish the tax burden that weights on the rest of society.
Before we proceed, we have to make the following assumption about the parameter `:
Assumption 2. We assume that the parameter `0 = (`  1) is strictly positive where `
represents the weight on the revenue from emissions taxes.
Assumption 2 ensures that the regulators objective function is concave, so the optimal
tax rates can be analytically derived by taking the rst-order conditions of the objective
function. Furthermore, it leads to positive quantities for both rms in equilibrium, and
implies that both rms pay a non-negative emissions tax.20
3 Analysis
3.1 The Full Information Case
It is useful to consider rst the complete information benchmark. Thus, in this section we
assume that all the uncertainty due to private or public information are perfectly observable
to all players in the game (i.e., rms and the regulator). The equilibrium with full information
can then give us a comparison regarding how uncertainty a¤ects the equilibrium output and
price. The full information equilibrium is characterized as follows.
Proposition 1. With full information, the regulator sets the following optimal taxes:
Fi =
 (2! + `0   1)
2 (`0 + !)
  ! (`
0 + 1) (xi + xj)
4 `0 (`0 + !)
+
xi(1  `0)
2`0
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (10)
where ! =

+2
3

.
20` can also be seen as the marginal cost of public funds. Di¤erent empirical research studies (see Long
and Soubeyran (2005)) found that 1 < ` < 2: In what follows, we restrict our analysis to this empirically
relevant range which means that 0 < `0 < 1.
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Given the optimal taxes in (10), the equilibrium output and price are as follows:
QF =
(`0 + 1) (2  (x1 + x2))
6 (`0 + !)
(11)
pF =
2 (2`0 + ! + 1) + (`0 + 1) (x1 + x2)
6 (`0 + !)
(12)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that in equilibrium, environmental taxes and the resulting output levels and price
are positive as long as the choke price  is high enough. Additionally, we can verify that, as
`0 tends towards one, 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; Fi = Fj . In this case, the regulator sets the same
tax rate for both rms.
3.2 The Asymmetric Information Case
Similar to the full information case, we rst analyze each rms prot maximization
problem, which is the second stage of the game. Given the public disclosed information
and their own private costs, rm i maximizes its own expected prots as a function of the
tax rates, set by the regulator. Note that the expectation operator in the rms problem is
dened over the other rms private marginal costs. Under our setting, rms use strategies
that are a¢ ne in their signals, then verify these strategies to form an equilibrium.
Each rm maximizes its expected prots. We show in Lemma 1 that the equilibrium
output for both rms are linear in the marginal cost components and the tax rates.
Lemma 1. Under asymmetric information, the parameter vector  can be calculated as
follows:
i1 =
(2 + ) + 
3(2 + )| {z }
i0
+
 2
3|{z}
i1
 i +

3|{z}
i2
 j; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (13)
12 = 22 =   1
 (2 + )
(14)
13 = 23 =   2
3
(15)
14 = 24 =
1
3
: (16)
Proof. See Appendix B.
This Lemma has a simple interpretation. It establishes that there exists a unique linear
solution to the optimization problem in the asymmetric information case. In fact, because
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the best response of a rm is linear in its expectations, and because we assumed linear
demand and costs functions, it is easy to verify that there do not exist solutions to rms
maximization problem other than the linear one.
Substituting the expressions of  in Lemma 1 into the expressions of eq1 and eq2, we solve
for the linear equilibrium for the rm outputs:
eqi =  +  ( j   2 i)
3
+

3 (2 + )
  eci
 (2 + )
  2eui
3
+
euj
3
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (17)
Note that eq1 and eq2 still depend on  1 and  2 only through 11 and 21 respectively. As
is evident from the last equation, the sensitivity of the equilibrium to private and public
information depends not only on the precision captured by , but also on the public and
private values of marginal costs. Given the industry output, we can then compute the market
price:
ep =  [eq1 + eq2] =    (11 + 21) + eu1 + eu2
3
+
ec1 + ec2
(2 + )
=
 +  ( 1 +  2)
3
  2
3 (2 + )
+
eu1 + eu2
3
+
ec1 + ec2
(2 + )
(18)
Similar to the associated literature, we focus in our analysis on the interior solution. Given
the best response function for both rms, the regulator maximizes the expected welfare to
set the optimal taxes in the rst stage of the game:
max
1;2
Eec1;ec2
fW ( 1;  2) eu1; eu2 (19)
3 fW ( 1;  2)    + 2
2
 eQ2 + 2X
i=1
[(  eui   eci) eqi +  `0  i eqi] (20)
where `0 = `   1 > 0 and the parameter ` > 1 represents the relative weight the regulator
denes on the revenue from emissions taxation: a higher value of ` implies the regulator puts
a higher value on its revenue component.
We describe the equilibrium taxes in proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Under asymmetric information and in the presence of publicly disclosed
information, a risk neutral regulator sets di¤erentiated tax rules given by:
 i =
(  c) (2! + `0   1)
2(`0 + !)
  (eui + euj)
4
(`0 + 1) !
`0 (`0 + !)
+
eui
2
(1  `0)
`0
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (21)
Proof. See Appendix C.
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Note that, the only di¤erence between the two tax rates in equation (21) is the last term
in both equations, which results from the di¤erence in publicly disclosed costs fu1; u2g.
Under our assumptions, the second-best solution will vary across polluters if the social
planner can use some observable rm-specic characteristics to gain some information about
the rmsmarginal costs. With this available information, even though it is incomplete, the
optimal emissions taxes may be di¤erentiated between polluters. Thus, all players internalize
the social value of information.
It is easy to show that under the asymmetric case, the informational rent conceded to
rms is dened by:
 i = 
F
i    i =
! (ci   cj) (`0 + 1)  2`0 (c + ci) (2! + `0   1)
4`0(`0 + !)
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (22)
 i is positive if and only if:
ci >
!cj(`
0 + 1) + 2`0c(2! + `
0   1)
!(1  3`0) + 2`0(1  `0)
In addition, we can show that  i is increasing in  for any   3(1 `0)22 :
@ i
@
=
(2! + `0   1)
2 (1  )2 (`0 + !) > 0 (23)
This means that  i is strictly decreasing in 2" which is not surprising since  =
2c
(2c+
2
")
:
Thus, the informational rent is decreasing with respect to the precision of the private noise.
Proposition 3. Given the equilibrium tax rates in equation (21), the equilibrium output for
each rm, the industry output, and the price can be calculated as follows:
qi =

`0 + 1
3
 
2 `0 (  c   eui)  (eui   euj) (3! + 2`0)
12  `0 (! + `0)

; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (24)
Q =
(`0 + 1) [2 (  c)  (eu1 + eu2)]
6(! + `0)
(25)
p =
2 (3! + 2`0   1) + (`0 + 1) (eu1 + eu2 + 2c)
6(! + `0)
: (26)
Proof. Straightforward using Proposition 2.
Once again, we suppose that  is large enough, thus shutdown will not arise. Given that
we calculate the market output and price, we can check how the environmental parameters
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and the weight on revenue a¤ect the industry output:
@Q
@`0
=  [2 (  c)  (eu1 + eu2)] (1  !)
6(! + `0)2
 0; if ! < 1 (27)
@Q
@!
=  (`
0 + 1) [2 (  c)  (eu1 + eu2)]
6 (! + `0)2
 0: (28)
The rst relation shows that if ! < 1, then an increase in `0 decreases the industry
output. In other words, as the regulator values the tax revenue more, the tax rates increase.
Consequently, competitors in the marketplace react by reducing the industry output in order
to avoid the burden of higher taxes. Thus, the regulator cannot ignore the impact of `0 on the
industry production e¢ ciency. However, when ! > 1 (i.e. for higher value of ), the partial
derivative of Q with respect to `0 is positive. This means that polluters react aggressively
in the product market to any increase in `0 and competition between players is exacerbated.
Meanwhile, industry output is decreasing in !. Since ! is increasing in both  and , an
increase in the damage parameter  or pollution parameter  discourages market production.
Figure 1: The equilibrium industry output for admissable parameter values.
Figure 1 shows these e¤ects of `0 and ! on the optimal industry output in the asymmetric
information case. In this gure, we assume that (eu1 + eu2) =  = 2 and  =  = 1. We
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consider di¤erent c values: c = 0:6 (red curve), c = 0:4 (green curve), c = 0:2 (yellow
curve), and c = 0:1 (blue curve). Finally, if c increases, then Q
 decreases

@Q
@c
< 0

which implies that an increase in the mean of the distribution of the private marginal cost
increases the rmstotal marginal costs. While the regulator sets the tax rates lower due to
higher expected total marginal costs, the end result is lower industry output.
3.3 Asymmetric Information without Publicly Disclosed Informa-
tion
We consider the case where there is no public component in rmsmarginal costs (i.e. eu1 =eu2 = 0). In this case, rmsmarginal costs are composed of only private information (i.e. eci =es + e"i). Since the regulator cannot observe either es or e"i, the rms are ex ante symmetric
according to the regulator when it sets the optimal tax rates. Consequently, the tax rates
are the same for both rms:
 i =
(  c) (2! + `0   1)
2(`0 + !)
; 8i = 1; 2: (29)
Intuitively, the only piece of information for the regulator to distinguish the two rms is
the publicly disclosed cost for each rm. In the absence of this information, the regulator
nds it optimal to apply the same tax rate for both rms, even though the rms may
have di¤erent private costs. The publicly disclosed information will be of value to decision
makers and serves as a di¤erentiation device. The environmental e¤ectiveness and economic
e¢ ciency of environmental taxes are improved further because the regulator can distinguish
the competitors and sets rm-specic environmental tax.
Furthermore, as demonstrated in equation (30), the optimal environmental tax rate is
increasing in `0 only if the environmental damage is low enough compared to the slope of the
demand curve:
@ i
@`0
=
(  c) (1  !)
2 (! + `0)2
 0; 8i = 1; 2; if ! =  + 
2
3
 1 (30)
@ i
@!
=
(`0 + 1) (  c)
2  (! + `0)2
 0; 8i = 1; 2: (31)
From equation (31), we conclude that the tax rate is increasing in !. Since ! = + 
2
3
is a linear and positive function of , the last relation yields that the tax rate is increasing
in the environmental valuation. Moreover, since the ! is increasing in , a higher pollution
rate (measured by pollution per output) increases the optimal tax rates.
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3.4 Comparative Statics
We now turn to the comparative statics of equilibrium under incomplete information with
respect to changes in model parameters. We nd useful to explore how marginal changes
in model parameters a¤ect the tax rates set by the regulator under public and private
information regimes. Without loss of generality, we analyze the comparative statics for  i,
the tax rate for rm i, and a similar analysis can be carried out for  j;j 6= i.
3.4.1 E¤ects of Environmental Valuation and Pollution Rate
We begin our analysis by investigating how the weight on revenue, denoted by `, a¤ects
the di¤erential tax rates in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Suppose that ! < 1, which implies that the steepness of marginal damages
satises   2
2
. For the rm with the lower public cost (i.e. eui  euj; i 6= j), the tax rate  i
dened in equation (21) is increasing in `0. Furthermore, for the rm with the higher public
cost, the tax rate is decreasing in `0 only if:
f =
euj   eui
  c   euj  2 (1  !) (`
0)2
! (! + (`0)2 + 2`0)
; where euj  eui; j 6= i: (32)
Proof. First, we calculate the partial derivative of the tax rate given in equation (21):21
@ i
@`0
 =
"
2 (  c   eui) (1  !) + (euj eui)(`0)2 (! + (`0)2 + 2`0)!
4  (! + `0)2
#
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (33)
Given the assumption on the damage parameter (i.e.  < 2
2
), the rst term in the
numerator on the right-hand side of equation (33) is positive. The second term in the
numerator is also positive for the rm with the lower public cost. As a result, the tax rate
for the lower public cost rm is increasing in `0.
Meanwhile, the partial derivative given in equation (33) is negative for the rm with the
higher public cost if the numerator on the right-hand side is negative. This is satised if the
condition in equation (32) holds.
This proposition states that the tax rate on rm i is increasing in `0 if it is more e¢ cient
(in terms of the public component of the marginal costs) than its rival j. This means
that, in the case of a widely applied Carbon tax or energy tax, we might get large extra
revenues. In contrast, if rm i has a higher publicly-known cost, then, for some values of
21Note that if the regulator does not value revenue, then it is easy to verify that 8i; j; i 6= j;  i =  c eui .
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`0 described in equation (32), the second term is negative and dominates the positive e¤ect.
This implies that the partial derivative is decreasing in that neighborhood. In other words,
an increase in `0 entails a negative impact on the tax rate, so on the expected revenue.
From a scal policy perspective, it is not obvious that environmental taxes have signicant
revenue-raising potential. Figure 2 shows the importance that the social planner assigns to
revenue. It presents the region described in equation (32), where the partial derivative is
decreasing in `0.
Figure 2: Variations of the tax rules with respect to `0 for admissible values of !.
3.4.2 E¤ect of Demand Parameters
The e¤ect of the choke price  on the tax rate  i for rm i can be derived by taking the
partial derivative of equation (21) with respect to :
@ i
@
=
(2! + `0   1)
2 (! + `0)
8<: 0; if `0  1  2 ! 0; otherwise. ; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (34)
According to equation (34), given `0, if the regulators weight on the damages, denoted by
, or the pollution rate, denoted by , are high enough relative to the slope of the demand,
denoted by , having a higher choke price  increases the tax rate set for rm i. Alternatively,
given !, if the weight on the revenue is high enough, then this would also result in higher
tax rates.
Meanwhile, the optimal tax rate is decreasing in the slope of the demand: a higher value
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for  implies a steeper demand, which leads to less production and pollution, so the regulator
decreases the tax rate:
@ i
@
=
 2
32

(`0 + 1) [2 (  c)  (eui + euj)]
4 (`0 + !)2

 0; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (35)
3.4.3 E¤ect of Cost Parameters
It is easy to verify that a rms optimal tax rate is decreasing in the publicly-observed
component of its marginal cost. A higher value for eui leads to less production and pollution,
thus the regulator decreases the tax rate:
@ i
@eui =

! (1  3`0) + 2`0 (1  `0)
4 (! + `0) `0

 0; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; if ! 

2`0 (1  `0)
3`0   1

: (36)
The e¤ect of the average private cost on the tax rate depends on the weights the regulator
has on the revenue and the environmental damage:
@ i
@c
=  @ i
@
=  (2! + `
0   1)
2 (! + `0)
8<: 0; if `0  1  2 ! 0; otherwise. ; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (37)
Assuming that this rst condition in equation (34) is satised, the result shows that
when the regulator faces private and public information, a higher mean of the distribution of
private costs increases the rmcosts (in expectation) because the signal is more informative,
which results in less production and pollution, so the regulator decreases the tax rate. In
fact, since the regulator uses emission taxes not only to curb emissions but also to correct the
underproduction that emerges in highly concentrated market structures, then an increase of
c implies an additional product market ine¢ ciency resulting from underproduction which
suggests that the regulator decreases the tax rate in order to o¤set the decrease in the output
industry. However, if `0 < 1 2 !, then the partial derivative is positive: environmental taxes
increase with respect to c. In this case, players in the marketplace are less productively
e¢ cient. Thus, polluters behave strategically and substantially overproduce, i.e., players are
more aggressive and competition is exacerbated. Such overproduction entails an increase in
pollution, thereby inducing the regulator to respond with tougher regulation. Finally, the
last inequality shows that, if `0  1   2 !; the optimal tax rate is increasing in the choke
price: higher demand results in more production, which entails an increase in pollution. As
a result, the regulator sets environmental taxes accordingly making playersoverproduction
e¤orts more costly.
If the environmental damage or the regulators valuation for the damage are high enough,
21
Social Value of Information Elnaboulsi, Daher, and Sa¼glam (2015)
then a regulator who is concerned with the market failure arising from underproduction,
avoids over-taxation which entails welfare loss, and sets emissions taxes accordingly. The
same optimal tax rate is decreasing in other rms publicly-observed marginal cost:
@ i
@euj =   (`
0 + 1) !
4 `0 (! + `0)
 0; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (38)
According to equation (38), a higher value of uj implies that rm j is getting less e¢ cient,
so rm i has a relatively higher market share than before. Therefore, the regulator decreases
the tax rate on rm i to encourage the output to be produced by the relatively more e¢ cient
rm.
4 Information Sharing
In this section, we analyze the situation where rms get together as a "team", tacitly
or cooperatively choose a strategy for how to face environmental policy, and then adhere to
this strategy. In the sharing information case, the problem is what the planner could do if
rms were to internalize their payo¤ interdependencies and appropriately adjust their use of
available information. Thus, our goal in this section is to know if sharing information about
costs is mutually benecial for rms.
We have seen that publicly disclosed information is relevant to regulators in setting
e¢ ciently environmental taxes. Therefore, publicly available information may a¤ect the
ability and incentive of market participants to coordinate their actions and hence the extent
to which market outcomes are characterized by collusion rather than competition22. Thus,
making information publicly available can undermine market performance and environmental
policy by facilitating collusive behavior. Electricity markets may be particularly conductive
to collusion since participants meet very frequently (every day in the spot market). Requiring
publication of detailed information on power generators output may facilitate collusion and
so undermine environmental regulation.
In the following, we compare two cases regarding the mode of competition and compare
the e¤ect of an ex ante policy instruments in both cases: non-sharing (NS) and sharing (S)
information between competitors in the marketplace.
Note that rms will voluntarily share valuable information if and only if they receive
information in return. If there is to be a net gain from information sharing, it must be the
22In the 1990s the US Congress passed a legislation concerning railroad freights mandating disclosure of
rm-specic information. Transparency requirements led to a signicant increase in freight rates which was
later proved to be a direct result of collusive behavior.
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case that expected prots per teammember exceed the expected prots when rms behave
alone, i.e., there must be an information gathering return to scale or information synergy.
Suppose that some mechanism exists for rms to truthfully share information on their
private costs, while the regulator still remains uninformed about the private costs.23 Thus,
the regulator imperfectly foresees rm-specic parameters and the future market conditions,
whereas the two rms have perfect information about their rivals marginal costs. In this
case, we examine if/when rms are better o¤ sharing their private information.
Proposition 5. When the regulator sets up emissions taxes to deal with pollution under
asymmetric information, if rms cooperatively share information about their costs, then the
optimal tax rules do not change.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix D.
In the sharing information game where rms receive perfectly the full vector of costs, this
proposition states that, when emissions taxes are the policy instrument in use, then with
imperfectly observed marginal costs the regulator sets the same environmental tax rule as
in the non-sharing information game.
Let
 
qSi ; q
NS
i

; i = 1; 2; denote the optimal quantities under sharing and non-sharing
information. Recall that under non-sharing information, 8i; j; i 6= j; the optimal quantities
are given by:
qNSi =
 + 
 
NSj   2NSi

+ (euj   2eui)
3
+

3 (2 + )
  ci
 (2 + )
(39)
We can show that in equilibrium
8i; j; i 6= j;Ecj

NSi
 ci =   qNSi 2 (40)
In the sharing information case, the optimal quantities are given by:
8i; j; i 6= j; qSi =
 + 
 
Sj   2Si

+ (uj   2ui)
3
+
cj   2ci
3
(41)
and the prots are:
8i; j; i 6= j; Si = 
 
qSi
2
(42)
23An outside agency may conduct the transmission of the private information according to the rms
commitments. We assume that the rms can verify each others report. This assumption has the same e¤ect
as the assumption that rms disclose the true value of their realized costs.
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We now examine whether or not rms are willing to share information. This depends on
a direct comparison of prots in each informational regime.
Proposition 6. Under emissions taxes, sharing information may occur and is mutually
benecial to rms when private marginal costs are high and the cost di¤erential between the
two rms is small. In addition, sharing information yields higher output level and entails an
increase in emissions in equilibrium.
Proof. We focus the analysis on the private part of the marginal costs, i.e. ci and cj since
ui;i=1;2 are common values. Since
 
Si ; 
S
j

=
 
NSi ; 
NS
j

; i 6= j, and given the expression of
prots in both cases, then we only need to compare quantities in order to see if rms have
incentive to share information about their costs. Lets consider rm i:
qi = q
NS
i   qSi =
  3ci
3 (2 + )
  cj   2ci
3
(43)
Thus, under our assumptions, the last relation yields:
E
 
NSi

= Si ) qNSi = qSi ) cj =
ci (1 + 2)
(2 + )
+
c (1  )
(2 + )
; j 6= i: (44)
Then if cj  ci(1+2)(2+) + c(1 )(2+) ) qNSi  qSi , which means that E
 
NSi
  Si : Similarly, if
ci  cj(1+2)(2+) + c(1 )(2+) then qNSj  qSj which also means that E
 
NSj
  Sj . As a result,
under these conditions, both rms are unwilling to share information about their private
costs.
However, this leaves room for the development of mutual and benecial sharing informa-
tion process. This is the case when rms are ine¢ cient and are relatively symmetric in their
private costs structure:(
cj  ci(1+2)(2+) + c(1 )(2+)
ci  cj(1+2)(2+) + c(1 )(2+)
)
(
qSj  qNSj
qSi  qNSi
(45)
The regulator cannot ignore the sharing information issue in this context because pooling
information leads to higher output level which entails an increase in emissions24, thereby
making the regulators task more di¢ cult to induce the desired optimal pollution level.
24Higher outputs imply higher consumerssurplus. As a result, environmental damage also increases and
o¤sets completely the increase in surplus

CS  D =   (+
2)
2 Q
2

. Thus, the resulting e¤ect on welfare
is negative.
24
Social Value of Information Elnaboulsi, Daher, and Sa¼glam (2015)
Figure 3: Pooling information between rms. S stands for "sharing information" and NS
stands for "non-sharing information".
As we can see on gure 3, both rms have incentives to share information in the North-
East region. In other words, if rms have high marginal costs levels, then sharing information
is benecial. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that 8i; j; i 6= j, if ci 2
h
0; c(1 )
(2+)
i
; then both
rms do not prefer to share information:
if ci = 0) cj = c (1  )
(2 + )
 c because
(1  )
(2 + )
< 1
if ci = c ) cj = c
This can be shown in the lower west region of Figure 3. Finally, in the last two regions,
at least one rm is unwilling to share information while the other prefers to do so. Thus,
no information sharing is not the unique equilibrium. Sharing information depends on the
value of rmsmarginal private costs and can be protable for rms and detrimental for
social welfare.
Since 2" has similar qualitative e¤ects on prots as on each rms output in equilibrium,
from the expression dening each rms output, we can analyze how a variation of the signal
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error a¤ects expected rm prots when there is no sharing information:
@qi
@
=
ci   c
 (2 + )2
(46)
This relation merits some brief discussion to display the intuition behind it in term of prac-
tical environmental policy. The sign of the rst derivative of rms i output variation with
respect to  is the sign of the di¤erence between its private marginal costs and the average
private marginal costs of the industry:
1. If ci  c ) @qi@  0. Firm i should benet from a reduction in 2", i.e., higher
precision. Higher values of  means equilibrium outputs have greater correlation. As a
result, the less e¢ cient rm becomes more aggressive in the market place and increases
its production which should yield higher expected prots. However, the rms natural
response to higher precision could be particularly inappropriate. In fact, since qNSi is
a function of NSi , the net e¤ect depends on the regulators reaction to an increase in
emissions resulting from an increase in production.
2. In contrast, if ci < c ) @qi@ < 0. An increase in  should reduce outputs and
expected prots. This is true for any ci < c, i.e., the e¢ cient rm in the market
place. Facing higher precision, rm i should benet from the reduction in 2": since the
signals of each rm become more correlated, an increase in  may increase its output
and expected prots under environmental regulation.
5 Conclusion
For years now, our attitude towards the environment has become heads we win, tails
future generations lose. Unfortunately, we inhabit a world with serious and severe environ-
mental problems. Mother nature is not a game. Changes that a¤ect those problems have
to be undertaken. The point of environmental regulation and of the designing and e¢ cient
environmental tax system is to accomplish deep and structural changes in the economic
and ecological behavior of individuals, households, and rms in order to curtail environmen-
tally and ecologically undesirable e¤ects. To this end, all prices in a given economy must
internalize the social cost of Carbon of all emissions.
Environmental taxation implemented by public authorities to protect the environment
has been broadly analyzed in the literature on environmental economics. Choosing the
appropriate environmental policy is a key part of successful regulation. The environmental
e¤ectiveness and economic e¢ ciency of environmental taxes could be improved further if they
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are well designed and implemented. The problem is that in any real world environmental
regulation scheme, regulators often face imperfect and asymmetric information. Although
many authors examined emissions taxes in the presence of asymmetric information, to our
knowledge, the role of disclosure has not been analyzed in the previous literature.
This paper deals with the informational problems faced by environmental policy makers
in their task of setting emissions taxes. Cost uncertainties have a signicant e¤ects on the
optimal control instrument adopted in our paper. We explored regulatory strategies in pro-
tecting environmental quality under private and common values about marginal costs. The
main nding is that a regulator facing private information only can not distinguish the play-
ers in the marketplace. Thus, in order to reduce environmental harm, the regulator sets a
common tax rule. Therefore, if the regulator has some rms-specic observable information,
then di¤erentiated emissions taxes may be optimally implemented. Public disclosed infor-
mation clearly enhances the e¢ ciency of emissions taxes design, i.e. equilibrium outcomes
and the subsequent welfare depend on the available information that agents can observe.
Today, e¤ort to enhance informational access may o¤er important lessons for environ-
mental regulation moving forward. There are enormous opportunities to make the best use
of available information to enhance the quality of the environment. Disclosed information
may be used to overcome a serious lack of information on polluted activities, and could have
impact on rmsbehavior and levels of pollution. Furthermore, by facilitating the dissem-
ination of environmental information in a meaningful way and the fact that information
disclosure satises the belief that the public has a right to know that they might be a¤ected
by third party pollution, our approach is politically more feasible to adopt and thus may not
be considered as coercive "new" regulations.
We then examined the situation where players in the marketplace share valuable infor-
mation. Even if public information enhances the regulatory process, disclosure, however,
facilitates information sharing and collusion. Comparing games with and without informa-
tion pooling, we highlight that, when emission taxes are the policy instrument in use, it is
obvious that information sharing may occur and leads to a superior outcome in terms of
industry output. Information sharing is mutually benecial for rms but is not environmen-
tally optimal. Finally, in order to give a better understanding of the impacts of public and
private information on the e¢ ciency setting of emission taxes, we presented comparative
statics and analyzed some special cases.
In our analysis, we focused on linear equilibria. We assumed linear demand and costs
functions coupled with an a¢ ne information structure: these assumptions are necessary for
tractability and are analytically convenient and conceptually satisfactory in the analysis of
environmental regulation with information asymmetry. Importantly, although we believe
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that the main nature of the results will be sustained for more general functions, our goal in
this paper is to demonstrate how disclosure can improve the regulatory process in setting
environmental taxes and how this information can give incentives to players to collude.
Future work that further explores and extends on these results can help shed more light on
emissions taxes in large industrial markets.
A Proof of Proposition 1
We solve for the equilibrium with full information using backward induction. First, we
formulate each rms prot maximization problem, which is the second stage of the game:
max
qi
i = [(p  xi     i) qi] ; 8i = 1; 2 (A.1)
where p =     (q1 + q2). The rst order conditions (FOC) of this prot maximization
problem leads to the best response function for each rm:
@i (qi; qj)
@qi
= 0 ) qi =   xi
2
   i
2
  qj
2
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (A.2)
Note that the second order conditions (SOC), which implies @
2i(qi;qj)
@q2i
=  2 ; 8i = 1; 2,
are satised since  > 0. In equilibrium, we obtain:
qi =
 + xj   2xi
3
+
 ( j   2 i)
3
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (A.3)
Given the best response functions, the equilibrium industry output and price are:
Q =
2  (x1 + x2)
3
   ( 1 +  2)
3
(A.4)
p =
 + (x1 + x2) +  ( 1 +  2)
3
(A.5)
The regulators welfare maximization problem is as follows:
max
1;2
W ( 1;  2) = (CS  D) +
2X
i=1
i + `R (A.6)
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This leads to the following FOCs:
@W
@ 1
=

3
 
 + 2

Q  ( + x2   2 x1) + `0 (3q1 +  ( 2   2 1))

(A.7)
@W
@ 2
=

3
 
 + 2

Q  ( + x1   2 x2) + `0 (3q2 +  ( 1   2 2))

(A.8)
where `0 = `   1. To solve for the optimal tax rates, we add and subtract the two FOCs
from each other:
@W
@ 1
  @W
@ 2
= 0 ) ( 2    1) =(x1   x2)(`
0   1)
2`0
(A.9)
@W
@ 1
+
@W
@ 2
= 0 ) ( 2 +  1) =(2  (x1 + x2)) (2! + `
0   1)
2 (! + `0)
(A.10)
Combining the last two equations yields the optimal tax rates, the equilibrium output,
and price given in equations (10)(12).
B Proof of Lemma 1
Following the same procedure in appendix A, we rst formulate each rms prot maxi-
mization problem:
maxeqi Eecj [(ep  eui   eci    i) eqi] ; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (B.1)
where ep =     (eq1 + eq2) and Eecj denotes the common expectation operator taken over ecj.
The FOC dening the best response functions for each rm are given below:
@Eei (eq1; eq2)
@eqi = 0 ) eqi =   eui   eci2    i2   E[eqj j eci]2 ; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (B.2)
The SOCs, which implies @
2Eei(qi;qj)
@(eqi)2 =  2; 8i = 1; 2, are satised since  > 0. Using
assumptions 1 and equation (7), the last two equations can be written as follows:
eqi =    i   eui   eci
2
  (j1 + j2E[ecj j ~ci] + j3euj + j4eui)
2
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (B.3)
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We simplify the best response functions to get:
eq1 =   1
2
  (21 + 22)
2| {z }
11
  ec1 1
2
+
22
2

| {z }
 12
  eu1 1
2
+
24
2

| {z }
 13
  eu223
2

| {z }
 14
(B.4)
eq2 =   2
2
  (11 + 12)
2| {z }
21
  ec2 1
2
+
12
2

| {z }
 22
  eu2 1
2
+
14
2

| {z }
 23
  eu113
2

| {z }
 24
(B.5)
which lead to the parameter values given in equations (13)(16).
C Proof of Proposition 2
To set the optimal taxes, the regulator maximizes the expected welfare:
max
<1;2>
Eec1;ec2
fW ( 1;  2) eu1; eu2 (C.1)
3 fW ( 1;  2)    + 2
2
 eQ2 + 2X
i=1
[(  eui   eci) eqi +  `0  i eqi] (C.2)
where eQ = eq1 + eq2 denotes the industry output. Using equations (13)(16), we get:
eqi =i1   eci
 (2 + )
+
euj   2eui
3
;8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (C.3)
eQ =eq1 + eq2 = 11 + 21   ec1 + ec2
 (2 + )
  eu1 + eu2
3
= A+B eC + F eU; (C.4)
A =11 + 21; B =   1
 (2 + )
; eC = ec1 + ec2; F =   1
3
; eU = eu1 + eu2; (C.5)
E
h eQ2i =A2 +B2E h eC2i+ F 2 eU2 + 2ABE h eCi+ 2AF eU + 2BF eUE h eCi : (C.6)
Remark 1. Since eC and eU are independent under our assumptions, it is easy to verify that:
E
h eCi =2c (C.7)
E
h eC2i =E ec21+ E ec22+ 2E [ec1ec2] = 42c + 42c   22": (C.8)
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Furthermore, we can compute the other term and the industry output as follows:
E
h eQi =E [eq1] + E [eq2] = A+ 2Bc + F (eu1 + eu2); (C.9)
E [ecieqi] =i1c + i2(2c + 2c) + i3euic + i4eujc; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (C.10)
2X
i=1
 iE(eqi) = 2X
i=1
[ i(i1 + i2c + i3eui + i4euj] ; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (C.11)
Finally, we obtain the expected welfare:
Eec1;ec2
hfW ( 1;  2)i =   + 2
2

Q
2
+ cQ+
2X
i=1
[`0  i qi + (  eui) qi]
+
"
2 (2c + 
2
")
 (2 + )
 
 
 + 2

(22c + 
2
")
2 (2 + )2
#
(C.12)
where qi = E(qi); i = 1; 2; Q = E(qi). Note that the second line on the right-hand side
does not depend on the tax rates, due to risk-neutrality. Given public information eu1; eu2,
maximizing equation (C.12) leads to the following FOCs:
@E[fW ( 1;  2)]
@ 1
= 0 =
 
 + 2

(A+ 2Bc +D (eu1 + eu2)) + c    + (2eu1   eu2)
+  `0 ( 2   2 1) + 3 `0 q1 (C.13)
@E[fW ( 1;  2)]
@ 2
= 0 =
 
 + 2

(A+ 2Bc +D (eu1 + eu2)) + c    + (2eu2   eu1)
+  `0 ( 1   2 2)  3 `0 q2 (C.14)
Solving the FOCs for  1 and  2, we obtain:
@E[fW ]
@ 1
  @E[
fW ]
@ 2
=0 ) ( 2    1) = (eu1   eu2) (`0   1)
2 `0
(C.15)
@E[fW ]
@ 1
+
@E[fW ]
@ 2
=0 ) ( 2 +  1) = [2(  c)  (eu1 + eu2)] (2! + `0   1)
2 (! + `0)
(C.16)
where we make use of Assumption 1. Solving for  1 and  2, we obtain the optimal tax rates
dened in proposition 2.
We also need to check conditions under which the regulators objective function in (C.12)
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is concave. Let H denote the Hessian of E[fW ( 1;  2)]:
H =
0@H (1; 1) = @2E[fW ]@21 H (1; 2) = @2E[fW ]@21
H (2; 1) = @
2E[fW ]
@12
H (2; 2) = @
2E[fW ]
@22
1A =  (! + 4`0) (! + 2`0)
(! + 2`0) (! + 4`0)
!  2
3

The expected welfare in equation (C.12) is concave in  1 and  2 if and only if the Hessian
matrix H is negative denite. In our case, we need to verify whether the naturally ordered
principal minors of the matrix alternate in sign:
 the rst naturally ordered principal minor is negative:
(! + 4`0)
 2
3

< 0 ) (! + 4`0) > 0;
 the second naturally ordered principal minor is positive, detH 0 > 0:H = (! + 4`0)2   (! + 2`0)2 > 0 ) (! + 3`0) (4`0) > 0 ) `0 > 0) ` > 1:
Since both conditions are satised, the tax rates dened in equation (21) maximize the
expected welfare.
D Proof of Proposition 5
In the case of merging, let the two rms share their private information on their marginal
costs. Therefore, we denote the marginal cost of production by xi = ui + ci; 8i = 1; 2.
Meanwhile, the information sharing between the rms is to nd a more protable outcome
for the rms. Therefore, the rms do not reveal their private costs to the regulator. At the
second stage of the game, under the shared information case, a rm i has to
max
<qi>
i = [(p  xi    i) qi] ; 8i = 1; 2: (D.1)
where p =    (q1 + q2). The FOCs lead to the following best response functions:
@i (qi; qj)
@qi
= 0 ) qi =   xi
2
   i
2
  qj
2
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (D.2)
Note that the SOCs verify the concave prot function (i.e., @
2i()
@(qi)
2 =  2; 8i = 1; 2).
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Solving the best response function leads to the equilibrium output and price:
qi =
 + (uj   2ui) + (cj   2ci)
3
+
 ( j   2 i)
3
; 8i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (D.3)
Q =
2 P2i=1 (ui + ci +   i)
3
; (D.4)
p =
 +
P2
i=1 (ui + ci +   i)
3
: (D.5)
Similar to equation (C.12), the expected welfare in this case equals:
Eec1;ec2
hfW ( 1;  2)i    + 2
2
 eQ2 + 2X
i=1
[(  eui   eci) eqi +  `0  i eqi] (D.6)
where terms that do not depend on the tax rates are suppressed. Given public informationeu1; eu2, maximizing equation (C.12) leads to the following FOCs:
@E[fW ]
@ 1
  @E[
fW ]
@ 2
) ( 2    1) = (eu1   eu2) (`0   1)
2 `0
(D.7)
@E[fW ]
@ 1
+
@E[fW ]
@ 2
) ( 2 +  1) = [2(  c)  (eu1 + eu2)] (2! + `0   1)
2 (! + `0)
(D.8)
Note that (D7) and (D8) are similar to (C15) and (C16). As a result, information sharing
does not a¤ect the tax rates since the regulator cannot observe marginal costs in either case.
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